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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

While overseas, I read in LOOK MAGAZINE the attached article by K. C. Wu, former Governor of Formosa, on "Your Money has built a police state in Formosa". It was shocking reading.

To what extent can reliance be placed on Mr. Wu? One is aware of the internecine warfares in all foreign countries. Yet, the charges made in this article, if partly valid, are very disturbing: the police state; Chiang's son with a Moscow background, etc.

Are you concerned by this?

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

Attachment -

Your money has built

a police state in

FORMOS

A former top associate of Chiang Kai-shek says the Gimo

has abdicated his powers to his oldest son,

who is turning Formosa into a communist-type state

By K. C. WU FORMER GOVERNOR OF FORM

THE true situation in Formosa today is a trastory few Americans have been told.

It is a story I know, because for three ye as its governor, I fought to make Formosa de ocratic—and lost.

You, the American people, should know story, because you are supplying three four of the money spent by the Chinese Nationa Government on Formosa. I owe it to you as was to my own countrymen to speak out ab what has happened.

Americans have been assured that a den cratic way of life has been established on beautiful and strategic island of Formosa. Yhave been told that an army of half a million more men is not only eager to attack but also serving as a threat on the flank of Commur China, should she commit her huge armies an invasion of Southeast Asia. You have be led to believe that Formosa today is the inspition, the hope and the spiritual home of fichinese all over the world, a strong link in the chain of your Pacific defenses and a stalw base from which a counter-assault may so

contin

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OSA continued





Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang Ching-kuo

man who seems to rule and the man who actually does

alissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the author says, has delegated most of wers to his 45-year-old son, Chiang Ching-kuo. The young Chiang ried to a Communist Russian and lived 14 years in the Soviet, he "received thorough instruction in the Communist state. He has to be a dangerously adept student." Today, Wu asserts, Chingas control over the army, the Kuomintang and the secret police.



Off Red-beld mainland, Formosa could launch only a "suicidal"

"The fighting forces on Formosa today simply are not effective. Unleashing

day be launched to free the Chinese mainland from its Communist oppressors.

How I wish I could tell you that all these assertions are true. But they are not. The sad part of the story is that at one time in the past they were actually becoming true, and at some time in the future, if proper action is taken, they may yet become true. But just now they are not.

For Formosa has been perverted into a police state, not unlike that of Red China, its professed adversary. Though Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is still the supreme ruler of the land, he has made his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, his heir and successor and has delegated most of his powers to him.

This first-born son, a man of 45, the child, not of Madame Soong Chiang, but of the Generalissimo's first wife, is married to a Communist Russian woman. He himself spent 14 of his adult years before World War II in the U.S.S.R., and there received thorough instruction in the organization and administration of the Communist state. He has proved to be a dangerously adept student. Today, he has virtual control over the ruling Kuomintang party; he has complete control over the army and seeks to make it entirely a personal instrument of power; as head of the secret police, he is fast building up regime that in many ways follows exactly the pattern of a Communist government; he has even organized a Youth Corps modeled after the Hitler Youth and the Communist Youth.

Even when I was in Formosa, many people expressed doubt as to where his real affiliations lay—with the Communists or with the free nations. Personally, I am inclined to believe that he is only propelled by his own overweening ambition and that he has pursued the Com-

munist ways of government because he knows no better. Bu who can be sure? Who can guarantee that, in the event of the of the Gino, Chiang Kai-shek, and an attractive offer from I he may not turn Formosa into a rich province of Red China?

Who tever may eventually happen, what is happening to Formosa cannot be condoned as you may condone Tito or I In those cases, you made the decision to get along with the your eyes open. Formosa is different. You are being deceive supplying 300 million of the 400 million dollars (U.S.) in the Formosan budget to create a totalitarian state. It is not even eent to do so. For the fighting forces on Formosa today simply effective Unleashing them to attack Red China would not a gamble, it might be suicide on our part. It might destroy any hopes of liberating the mainland.

U. S. Should Seek Reforms on Formosa

The realization of this was what finally caused me to breachiang Kai-shek's regime. That does not mean that I have a tentions to wreck his government. I only want it to adopt the I that it so sorely needs.

Nor do I think that it is in the interest of the American to withGraw your support of Formosa. I only want you to s that it is used to a good purpose and that Formosa is forget truly effective weapon against communism.

The situation that prevails in Formosa in the meantime me keen y and personally, for it developed while I was there. I hard against it, but I lost.

It was on December 21, 1949, at the most critical hour



soldiers of Chinese Nationalist army look happy. But author says troops have been "demoralized" by commissar system Chiang Kai-shek's son has set up.

k Red China might destroy forever any hopes of liberating the mainland"

when the Communists were overrunning the last Nationalist on the mainland, that I was appointed governor of Formosa. In until October, 1950, when the Chinese Communists en-Korean War, I had practically a free hand in carrying out to bring democracy to the island. The only order Chiang gave me in that period was to raise 42 million Taiwan U. S. \$8,400,000) every month to pay the troops, and the often triely to me.

task was not easy. A Communist invasion of Formosa apo imminent that my wife and I bought cyanide capsules to for any eventuality. There was also widespread discontent Land. The Formosans, who are Chinese by race, had been \exists by Japanese rule for 50 years when the mainlanders took r World War II. The new rulers got a joyful welcome. But iang Kai-shek's first military governor, General Chen Yi, ome did not last long. Corruption, tyranny and, finally, in rrible massacre left the Formosans stunned and estranged. ernors who succeeded Chen Yi did little to heal the breach. e was hardly any American aid to speak of. The local note increased 14-fold in the previous seven months, so that was almost beyond control. Hordes of refugees from the were streaming over and had to be resettled. The number swollen by evacuated forces, rose from 30,000 to 450,000 y to 600,000—on an island of 8 million people. The unjust zure was bleeding some sections of the population and leavs almost untouched; the government's income was desinadequate.

I to get things done rapidly if the government was to sur-

vive. First of all, we needed money for government expenditures and to meet the payment of the troops.

To raise funds, I ordered the quick sale of some 20,000 confiscated Japanese houses at about 70 per cent of their assessed value. Another move was the sale of "Liberty Bonds" for the rich and small-denomination savings for the poor. The houses sold quickly, and, to dispose of the bonds, never exactly popular with the Chinese, I used a firmly persuasive approach instead of compulsion. With those measures, we moved toward immediate solvency.

I also adopted a long-range plan to carry out basic tax reforms. When I arrived, 70 per cent of all taxes were coming from the farmers; when I left, they were paying only 8 per cent of the total revenue. Tax returns for 1950 were 600 per cent greater than 1949.

Generals Would Pad Troops' Payroll

With the revenue we got, I paid the soldiers promptly and regularly twice each month—a procedure unknown to the Chinese armies on the mainland. The troops had been demoralized on the mainland because the generals had had the habit of padding their payrolls and failing to pay the soldiers.

But most of all my heart was set on the fundamental reforms I thought were so necessary to make Formosa the rallying point of all the enlightened forces of China in the hopes of liherating the mainland from the Communists. I aimed to heal the breach between the Formosans and the mainlanders in order to forge them into a solid unit against communism. What I planned to do was to give our government truly popular support.

With that purpose, I reorganized the cabinet of the provincial

continued

FORMOSA continued

"My democratic measures were by Chiang as bait to get U. S. moi

government, appointing Formosans to 17 of the 23 cabinet parried out land reforms, started by my immediate predecess went on to provide ownership by tenant farmers. I also se system of security insurance for labor.

Besides taking those steps, I laid special emphasis on two—the rule of law and democratic government through free ele

We have always had a secret police operating under the I knew that we had to do everything to prevent and dig out munist infiltration. But I also knew the abuses of our secret They would arrest people employed in the island's Departr Finance without warrants and without even the finance comm er's knowledge. They did not even make sure on every occasion they had the right man. They would enter an office, revolved hand, say to a frightened man behind a desk, "Are you Wang drag him away. I used to get such prisoners released, and by the of 1950 I even got an order from the Gimo that arrests of cinnust be made only with warrants from my civil police.

I also introduced and got a law providing for free elect mayors and magistrates and of city and district councils. We c the elections into three stages, first the east coast, then the area and last the west coast.

Morale Rises, Then Gets a Jolt

The first free elections in all Chinese history were held in 1950, on the east coast of Formosa. Anyone who was an eye-v to those elections must have shed his last suspicion that Orient ples were not fit for democracy and did not care for it. Over cent of the people enthusiastically went to the polls.

As morale in the army and among the civilian populatio the risk of a Communist invasion diminished. United States c and other visitors were impressed and pleased, and more Am aid came. Although I knew that the old-line politicians were j I believed I had the full support of Chiang Kai-shek, and the I was too confident and too busy to worry.


Then, in October 1950, the Chinese Reds intervened in the rean War, and the atmosphere began to change. Until that tir Gimo's objective, I now sadly perceive, had been to secure Ammoney and American support. I was used as a façade, and my ures for democratization were mere bait. When he came to I that by force of circumstances he had become indispensable United States, he began to listen more and more to the persu of his son, with the sole purpose of perpetuating his, or their,

The first signs of trouble came when the elections in the carea of the island were about to take place. Elections were the general supervision of my commissioner of civil affairs, ar pendent formosan not connected with the Kuomintang part leading candidates for mayor in two principal cities also we dependent Formosans. It looked as though the Kuomintan didates were going to be defeated. The party therefore appet the Gimo to intervene, and he sent me a secret written order me to dismiss my commissioner and to coerce the independer mosans into retiring from the race. I had to offer Chiang Ka my resignation before he would rescind his order.

This cleared the decks for a free election that time, bu that time on the party perfected its machinery of manipulation the secret police as its instrument of execution. The later ele on the west coast, I must confess, were far from free.

But I continued to try to remedy this evil. I recommende the party cease to be financed by government funds. I urged to opposition be allowed, even encouraged, or at least, as in T that the one official party be permitted to split into two partic the Gimo would not agree. When the Seventh Kuomintang ference convened in the summer of 1952, he himself handall the delegates, three quarters of them his son's stooges. And a election of the party's Central Executive Committee, he 1





lliam F. Knowland gets in a huddle with Chiang's officers on visit-sa. Author says VIP's get idea "everything is sweetness and light."

out a list of candidates and even required all of the ballots gned!

was in the fall of 1950, too, that I became aware that the son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was the real head of the secret poto that time, I had thought he was officially only the head olitical Department of the Ministry of Defense, appointed by er in March, 1950. But I did not know, as I learned later, that dquarters of the secret police is in the President's office-and no, of course, is the President. The man who really ran the as, and is, Chiang Ching-kuo. Usually he stayed behind the the hatchet man he generally employed during my time was Meng-chi, deputy commander of the Peace Preservation Thus the tentacles of Chiang Ching-kuo's control spread and ≥d over all of the government.

Chiang's Son Reveals His True Role

ang Ching-kuo moved personally into my field of vision in of the Taiwan Match Company. The chairman of the board own to have financed a movie, Forty Years of China, in which no was presented in a light something less than effulgent. ions were made against the chairman that he had made a th the Communists. After the evacuation of the mainland, r, he had gone to the British colony of Hong Kong; the next n the company, who was in Formosa, was the general manahonest businessman with no political affiliations, who had een in Hong Kong since the mainland was evacuated. Never-I heard one day that he had been jailed.

er I ordered him released for lack of evidence against him, Ching-kuo himself came to my office frankly in his position as head of the secret police. He was accompanied by his hatchet ing Meng-chi. All subterfuges were tossed to the winds. Even ice to the rule of law was ignored. Chiang Ching-kuo said was the Gimo's wish that the manager be shot and the rich Match Company confiscated.

en I could not agree to that, the case was transferred to a court. I then wrote the Gimo himself, protesting the illeand injustice of the arrest. I got no direct reply, but the Gimo secretary to me to say that the general manager would not but merely sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

re and more arrests and convictions of that kind took place, sufficient evidence and without semblance of a fair trial. asure to which I had made the Gimo agree before—no arrest a warrant from my civil police-I found inadequate to cope continued

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ARLING'S ALE

BREWING COMPANY, CLEVELAND, OHIO



Formosa children learn how to cead. write. Educational program flourished, author says, until Redtype Youth Corps was established.



Nationalist troops like these putting on a training show, K. C. Wu writes, "hate the commissars, and feel helpless against them."

"A program is under way to cont

with the situation. It only kept me posted on the arrests the been made. But I had no say about the trials. As Formosa hadeclared under a state of siege, all cases of any nature were military courts for trial. These courts always met in secret, counsel was allowed defendants. So, finally, in January, 1952, to the Gemo to complain about the outrages of the secret polithe mockery of the military courts. I proposed that all crimina except those involving communism and espionage be sent toourts, not military courts, for trial, and that counsel for defeallowed in the military courts.

The Gimo showed reluctance to accept the proposals. I offered my resignation. I had never yet complained directly about his son, but now I decided I must. I said:

"If you love your son, do not have him as head of the police. He will become the target of the people's hatred."

Although I spoke quietly and earnestly, the Gimo was aback. He walked over to the mantelpiece and rested his he his hand "Don't talk to me like that," he said, "I have a head

I never had to come to grips with the Gimo's son in his in ing control of the army, for that was out of my bailiwick. I cot fail to know what was going on, however, because I had been I the troops. That task was taken away from me in 1951, but m tact with the army, as it was quartered in my province, was int Moreover, my outspoken advocacy of democratic methods was known. So everywhere I went, officers and enlisted men of both and navy would pour out their hearts to me in private.

The Political Department of the Ministry of Defense, whi young Chiang headed, was originally set up to instill anticomm and uplift the troops' morale. But as soon as Chiang Ching-ku office, he began to develop it into a system of political comn after that of the Soviet. The result has been that there are two fofficers—ordinary service officers and political officers, sepa trained and controlled. This is demoralizing and confusing en working against the sound principle of "the direct chain of mand." To make matters worse, all promotions are by the Gim on the recommendation of Ching-kuo. I know many cases commanders were demoted, discharged and even imprisone cause they could not get along with Ching-kuo's agents.

Troops' Feelings Don't Match Show

The outward appearance of the troops is good enough. It visitor who sees them once or twice, they seem well fed, well cand ready to go. VIP's always get a big show, with live bullets, is very impressive. It is always more or less the same, but a seems to compare notes. But the troops' feelings don't mate show. They hate the political commissars and feel helpless a them. They seem to be a splendid body without a soul.

Some of the middle-class officers, intelligent, patriotic an terly anti-Communist, even went so far as to tell me separate in almost identical words, "If fight we must one day, we shal to kill the political agents first!"

Only real insiders know this because Chiang Ching-kuo litical Department has devised slick and practically foolproof ods of creating the illusion that all is sweetness and light.

The dictatorial moves to establish a secret police and c the army, to rig elections and corrupt legal processes were a start. Today, a program is underway to control the minds and of youth and suppress freedom of speech and of the press.

Our schools made wonderful progress during my administic The school population, ages 6 to 12, rose from 70 to 85 per cent children on Formosa. We also made higher education availa both Formosans and mainlanders. At Taiwan University, we left, 70 per cent of the students were Formosans.

Then Ching-kuo organized his Youth Corps. He order superintendents, professors and teachers to become officers a students enrolled as members. He ordered changes in the teastaffs and the rules. We now have a Red version of the Hitler Ju

There is no such thing as freedom of speech any more. Free of the press has become a farce. There may be an exception

·f youth and curb free speech"

weekly sponsored by Dr. Hu Shih, the philosopher and diprith his special eminence and international reputation. But had many unpleasant experiences when he visited Formosa. Newspapers that annoy or offend Formosa's rulers are suspend publication, and reporters and writers have often led. Formosa's newspapers now print only the party line. taxpayers of both Formosa and the United States are paying pkeep of the Youth Corps, the secret police, the Kuomintang ness other authoritarian instruments. They naturally do not at, for the expenses are spread around and disguised in the that no outside budget expert can find them. For instance, stry of Defense may have an item in its budget for "support llas-\$20,000,000." This may be raised to \$25,000,000, with millions going for unbudgeted activities.

he end of 1952, I was obliged to admit to myself that the rule ad democracy I had been striving for was a lost cause.

because I still wanted to keep my government from getting publicity in the United States, I waited until after President wer's inauguration to send my resignation to the Gimo and with a heavy heart to leave Formosa. It was not easy. It is easant to admit failure, and it is with a special poignant sorone sees a lifetime's efforts defeated. I had to leave the ho had believed in and followed me.

Threats and Then Violence

Gimo at first would not accept my resignation, and only me a month's "sick leave." Then he resorted to threats to ack to my office. Shortly thereafter, there was a dastardly on my life and my wife's. It was evidently to the advantage me in authority to have me either under close surveillance sa or to make me silent forever.

n, after my resignation, I applied for passports for myself, and my son to come to America, my request at first was retained by then I had received several invitations to speak in the tates, and my alma mater, Grinnell College, in Iowa, had pronfer an honorary LL.D. on me; I told the Gimo's emiswould have to tell the world that my passport was refused yown government. That got me my passport. My wife got pugh the intercession of Madame Chiang. But the Gimo transit grant my son a passport, despite his being a minor, a boy 1953, and despite my repeated requests since coming to that he be allowed to join us here as a dependent (now that my living in this country as a lecturer). It took a full year e passport was finally issued.

ived in this country at the end of May, 1953. At first, I kept re. I still hoped against hope that the rulers of Formosa the light and change their ways.

it was useless. Last March, I broke with the Chiang regime. not out of personal grievance and frustration that I finally is out of a sincere consideration for the larger issues at things are permitted to continue as they are in Formosa, will millions in aid be wasted, but the hope of the Chinese recovering the mainland will be lost.

e matter comes to the worst, both the United States and the nself may awake one day and find that they cannot even ormosa effectively against the onslaughts of communism.



A graduate of Grinnell College and of Princeton University, K. C. Wu served under Chiang Kai-shek as cabinet member, mayor of leading Chinese cities and his personal secretary, as well as governor of Formosa. He and his wife are both Christians. They have a home today in Evanston, Ill.

END



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